Unlawful Agricultural Working Conditions as Nuisance or Unfair Competition by Judson, Philip L.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 19 | Issue 2 Article 9
1-1967
Unlawful Agricultural Working Conditions as
Nuisance or Unfair Competition
Philip L. Judson
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Philip L. Judson, Unlawful Agricultural Working Conditions as Nuisance or Unfair Competition, 19 Hastings L.J. 398 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol19/iss2/9
UNLAWFUL AGRICULTURAL WORKING CONDITIONS
AS NUISANCE OR UNFAIR COMPETITION
California has enacted ample legislation to insure the agricultural
laborer at least minimally healthful, comfortable and safe working
conditions. However, compliance with the statutory and regulatory
requirements by agricultural employers has been found seriously
lacking. Although the statutes impose criminal penalties, enforce-
ment has proved difficult and generally unsatisfactory. Farm work-
ers, many of them migratory, are in a disadvantageous bargaining
position and are forced to pursue their occupation under conditions
that should have been eliminated years ago. Two solutions are
proposed. Both are civil actions seeking the equitable remedy of
injunction: in the first case to abate a public nuisance, and in the
second, to restrain unfair competition.
The Problem
A summary of the applicable statutory and administrative provi-
sions will aid in understanding the problem discussed and the solu-
tions proposed. Employers of farm labor must provide fresh and
pure drinking water and permit access thereto at reasonable and con-
venient times and places.' The use of common drinking cups is pro-
hibited,2 and separate cups must be provided.3 Water containers must
be covered and the water drawn by means of a faucet rather than by
dipping or pouring.4 One who employs five or more persons or any
woman or minor in growing or harvesting food crops must provide
toilet and handwashing facilities6 which employees are required to
use.7 The facilities must be located conveniently (no more than a
5-minute walk where possible) and so as not to contaminate crops.8
Toilet paper, clean water and soap, as well as privacy, must be pro-
vided and the facilities must be clean.9 The use of common towels is
prohibited.10 One such facility is required for each 40 workers or
fraction thereof."
In addition to the sanitation regulations, numerous provisions
are made for safety and general welfare. For example, women cannot
be required to lift more than 25 pounds, 12 meals and rest periods
' CAL. LABOR CODE § 2441.
2 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3700.
3 Parkhurst v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 20 Cal. 2d 826, 129 P.2d 113
(1942); 8 CAL. ADM. CODE § 11500(12).
4 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3702.
5 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 5474.22; 8 CAL. ADM. CODE § 11500(1).
6 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 5474.23; 8 CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 11500(13)-
(14).
7 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 5474.24.
8 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 5474.25-.26, .28.
9 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 5474.25-.26; 8 CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 11500
(13)-(14).
10 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3800.
11 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 5474.27.
12 8 CAL. ADm. CODE § 11500(16).
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must be provided for women and minors,13 and employers must pro-
vide first aid equipment.' 4
California Rural Legal Assistance 5 recently conducted a field in-
vestigation to determine the extent of compliance with working con-
dition laws. The results of the investigation were used to support
a request that the Bureau of Employment Security, United States
Department of Labor, withdraw the certification allowing entry into
the United States of 8100 Mexican braceros to work for five California
growers' associations.'0 In the brief filed by California Rural Legal
Assistance, violations by members of the San Joaquin Farm Produc-
tion Association and others in a seven-county area were cited as
representative of widespread failure to comply with the law.'7 These
allegations were supported by the affidavits of workers interviewed.'8
Eighty-one violations of the sanitation regulations outlined above
were found, as well as other abuses.19 One woman who was employed
in a field without a toilet reported that "[t]he people use the ground
and sometimes we get our feet in the messes.120 Another reported
bruises on her abdomen resulting from carrying 60-pound tomato
boxes.21 Most often the violations noted were lack of any toilet or
handwashing facilities and unsanitary common drinking containers.
22
A synthesis of the results of agriculture investigations made by
the California Division of Industrial Welfare during the period
from January to September 1966 supports the above findings.23 A
'3 CAL. ADM. CODE §§ 11500(10)-(11).
'4 CAL. ADm. CODE § 11500(15).
15 CRLA is a statewide law firm funded by the Office of Economic Op-
portunity.
16 32 Fed. Reg. 4570 (1967) provides for denial of certification when state
or local labor or health laws have been violated by the requesting party.
17 Brief and Documentation Requiring Withdrawal of California Braceros,
submitted by California Rural Legal Assistance to U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau
of Employment Security, at 13 (Sept. 1967).
18 Id. at 13-17.
'9 Id. at 13-14.
20 Id. at 14.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 17. A summary of the data collected was given as follows:
"Toilets Ex. 12, Beatriz Sepeda (Aredundo)-no toilets at all.; Ex. 13 Father
Avila-one dirty toilet for 120 people; Ex. 14, Joyce Brown-no way to wash
hands, no toilet paper; Ex. 15 Helen Riggs--one toilet, not clean, 'sometimes
can't help it and have to use it'; Ex. 16 Chester Witherspoon-filthy toilet no
toilet paper; Ex. 17, Mark Day-no toilets; Ex. 18, Martin Garcia-no toilets;
Ex. 19, Alfredo Andrade-one distant toilet; Ex. 20 Santo Gonzales-no
toilets; Ex. 21, Eurigua Ortiz-no toilet paper, no hand washing facilities;
Ex. 22, Betty Brown-no toilet paper ever; Ex. 24, Francisca Tobar-a distant
toilet without soap or towels; Ex. 26, Jose Ortiz-no toilets; Ex. 27, Domingo
Nunez-one toilet with no water; Ex. 28, Lorenzo Avila-no toilets or hand
washing facilities anywhere; Ex. 29, Jimmy Brown-one unclean toilet; Ex.
30, Beatrice Brown-;. [sic] Ex. 31, William A. Brown-one dirty toilet; ....
Drinking Water Ex. 12, Beatriz Sepeda-sometimes no water, always the same
cup; Ex. 15, Helen Riggs-can is dirty and smells bad; Ex. 32, Manuel Garcia
-warm water; Ex. 51, J. W. Riggs-one coke bottle for 75 people, frequently
run out of water; Ex. 61, Ernestina Flores-no water; with almost no excep-
tions the remaining declarants (Ex. 13-66) were compelled to share the one
drinking container provided on the jobs with all of their fellow workers."
23 This synthesis is on file in the office of the Division of Industrial
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total of 948 employers were contacted, and the results were tabu-
lated by number of employers in violation of major provisions of





The results of the two investigations discussed indicate a serious
difficulty in law enforcement. All of the statutes cited above are
criminal, the violation thereof being a misdemeanor. 25 That the
criminal law has proved inadequate to bring agricultural working
conditions up to required standards is shown by the fact that the
CRLA investigation of 1967 reveals substantially the same level of
compliance as that which existed during the previous year, when
the Industrial Welfare Division reported its findings. 2 Although
the Division investigates complaints made to it regarding unlawful
working conditions and conducts inspections aimed at correcting de-
ficiencies, this agency is understaffed to meet the problem on the
large scale in which it exists. 2 7 It is suggested that resort to the
civil remedy of injunction for abatement of a public nuisance or for
restraint of unfair competition would provide a more suitable solu-
tion than the criminal law.
Nuisance
Generally, equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime.2
This rule is embodied in the California Civil Code,29 and is derived
from the common law.30 The only common law exception was that
Welfare, Department of Industrial Relations, State of California, 455 Golden
Gate Avenue, San Francisco.
24 Industrial Welfare Division Order No. 14-65, available at any office
of the Division, is 8 CAL. ADM. CODE § 11500.
25 CAL. HEALTH & SAPETY CODE §§ 3704, 3803, 5471.31; CAL. LABOR CODE
§§ 2440-41.
26 This conclusion is supported by the fact that the only reported case
involving violation of any of the statutes cited is Parkhurst v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 20 Cal. 2d 826, 129 P.2d 113 (1942), wherein an employee
sought and recovered workmen's compensation for amoebic dysentery to
which he was exposed when his employer provided water from an open
bucket and in a common cup. It should be noted that the statutes requiring
toilet and handwashing facilities (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 5474.20-.31)
are recent, having been added in 1965 (Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1417, § 1, at 3339).
This suggests another reason for lack of compliance, enforcement and, more
important, attempts to enjoin violations.
27 Interview with Jeanne Butcher, Assistant Chief, Division of Industrial
Welfare, Department of Industrial Relations, State of California, in San Fran-
cisco, Oct. 19, 1967. The Division intensifies its inspection effort during harvest
seasons by using personnel from its city offices, however, since agriculture
is but one of 14 occupational areas under its regulation, it can cover only a
small fraction of the State's large agricultural industry. Id.
28 Perrin v. Mountain View Mausoleum Ass'n, 206 Cal. 669, 275 P. 787
(1929); Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 47 Cal. 2d 11, 300 P.2d
831 (1956); People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P.2d 946 (1942).
29 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369.
30 Perrin v. Mountain View Mausoleum Ass'n, 206 Cal. 669, 275 P. 787
(1929). See generally CAL. Civ. CODE § 5.
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an action could be brought by a private person who suffered par-
ticular damage3' from a public nuisance.32  Although section 3369
of the Civil Code does not itself provide a remedy for public nui-
sance, it has recognized this exception since its enactment in 1872
3
and continues to do so in its present form.
34
Much confusion has attended the development of the law of nui-
sance as a result of the two distinct areas into which the field is
divided and the numerous types of conduct which constitute a nui-
sance.35 Nuisance has been characterized as a field of liability rather
than a type of tortious conduct.36 A common law private nuisance
consisted of some type of substantial nontrespassory invasion of the
plaintiff's right to the use and enjoyment of his land.37 Unless
there was interference with this right, no nuisance action would
lie.38  A public nuisance, on the other hand, was almost anything
which caused inconvenience to the public in the exercise of a com-
mon right,39 such as the right to travel a public highway without
obstruction. 40 Creation or maintenance of a public nuisance was a
31 "Particular damage" as used herein has usually been referred to as
"special damage," but because of the use of the latter term in defamation,
Dean Prosser has suggested the term "particular damage" as more definitive,
and his suggestion will be followed here. Prosser, Private Action For Public
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, Private
Action].
32 Johnson v. V.D. Reduction Co., 175 Cal. 63, 164 P. 1119 (1917); McIvor
v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946); CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 3493; W. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 608 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
33 CAL. Crv. CODE § 3369 (1872).
34 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369 now reads as follows:
"1. Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a
penalty or forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a penal law, except in a case
of nuisance or unfair competition.
"2. Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair
competition within this State may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
"3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and include
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, untrue or mis-
leading advertising and any act denounced by Business and Professions Code
Sections 17500 to 17535, inclusive.
"4. As used in this section, the term person shall mean and include
natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, as-
sociations and other organizations of persons.
"5. Actions for injunction under this section may be prosecuted by the
Attorney General or any district attorney in this State in the name of the
people of the State of California upon their own complaint or upon the com-
plaint of any board, officer, person, corporation or association or by any
person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public."
35 PROSSER § 87, at 592-94.
36 Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953);
PROSSER § 88, at 598.
37 PROSSER §§ 87, 90, at 593, 611.
38 Cox v. Ray M. Lee Co., 100 Ga. App. 333, 111 S.E.2d 246 (1959); Leder-
man v. Cunningham, 283 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); PROSSER § 90, at
611 n.91.
39 PROSSER § 89, at 605.
40 James v. Hayward, 79 Eng. Rep. 761 (K.B. 1631); PROSSER §§ 87, 89,
at 593, 606.
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crime and, at first, only a crime.41 It was not until 1536 that it was
recognized that an individual who suffered particular damage could
bring an action in his own right,42 and the requirement continues
that the plaintiff suffer damage different from that incurred by the
public.43 The two types of nuisance have little in common other than
the name and the fact that someone is harmed.44  Indeed, if the
plaintiff's injury does not consist of an invasion of his rights in land
or of particular damage from conduct that constitutes a public nui-
sance, he has no action for nuisance at all.45 This is not to say that
there can be no nuisance which is both public and private.46 If the
plaintiff's particular damage is an interference with his rights in
land, the nuisance is private as to him. Particular damage in a public
nuisance action need not be of this kind, however.4 ' It is true that
most cases involve property rights48 and this may be one reason why
the courts refer so often to the interference with such rights as con-
stituting particular damage from a public nuisance without saying
that the damage could also have consisted of personal injury or per-
sonal property damage.49 But the original instance of particular dam-
age was an injury resulting from a highway obstruction 50 and many
cases since have allowed an action for public nuisance where no real
property rights were involved.51
California has codified much of the law of nuisance.52 The Civil
Code defines a nuisance as
[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive
to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or un-
lawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner,
of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any
41 PRossER § 87, at 593.
42 Prosser, Private Action 1005, quoting Fitzherbert, J., in Anon., Y.B.
Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 26, pl. 10 (1536).
43 Perrin v. Mountain View Mausoleum Ass'n, 206 Cal. 669, 275 P. 787
(1929); Smith v. Collison, 119 Cal. App. 180, 6 P.2d 277 (1931); Donahue v.
Stockton Gas & Elec. Co., 6 Cal. App. 276, 92 P. 196 (1907); Prosser, Private
Action 1005.
44 PROSSEa § 87, at 594.
45 Mandell v. Pivnick, 20 Conn. Supp. 99, 125 A.2d 175 (Super. Ct. 1956);
Lederman v. Cunningham, 283 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); PROSSER
§ 87, at 594 n.17; cf. Reinhard v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d
741, 107 P.2d 501 (1940).
46 County of Yolo v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 (1868); Freitas v.
City of Atwater, 196 Cal. App. 2d 289, 16 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1961); Biber v.
O'Brien, 138 Cal. App. 353,.32.P.2d 425 (1934) (dictum); PROSSEs. § 87, at 594.
47.PROSSER § 89, at 6.09.
48 E.g., Fisher v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 493, 61 P. 82 (1900).
49 Perrin v. Mountain View Mausoleum Ass'n, 206 Cal. 669, 275 P. 787
(1929); Stegner v. Bahr & Ledoyen, Inc., 126 Cal. App. 2d 220, 272 P.2d 106
(1954); McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946);
Hopkins v. MacCulloch, 35 Cal. App. 2d 442, 95 P.2d 950 (1939); see note 53
infra.
50 See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
51 Leahan v. Cochran, 178 Mass. 566, 60 N.E. 382 (1901); Downes v. Silva,
57 R.I. 343, 190 A. 42 (1937); cf. Biber v. O'Brien, 138 Cal. App. 353, 32 P.2d
425 (1934).
52 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479-3503.
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public park, square, street, or highway .... 15
A public nuisance is then defined as "one which affects at the same
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable num-
ber of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage in-
flicted upon individuals may be unequal." 54 Any other nuisance is
private.5 5 It should be noted that, unlike the common law rule,
these statutory definitions do not impose the requirement that the
plaintiff's rights in land need be invaded before he can bring an
action for private nuisance, nor has any case been found which di-
rectly so holds.56 The statute has been construed, however, to restate
the common law definition of public nuisance,57 at least as to common
law forms of action, and it is probable that the definition of private
nuisance would be so limited as well.
Since violations of working condition laws, as to the laborers
themselves, constitute no invasion of real property rights, an action
by workers to enjoin such violations on the basis of private nuisance
would almost certainly fail. What must be found, then, if a nuisance
action is to succeed, is that the workers suffer particular damage
from a public nuisance. To determine that the violations are a public
nuisance two requirements must be met. First, the requisite num-
ber of persons must be affected by the unlawful working conditions; 58
and second, the conditions themselves must fall within the broad
definition of nuisance provided by the Civil Code.59
Under the statute,60 the minimum number of persons who must
be affected in order that a public nuisance exist is either a "neighbor-
hood" or a "considerable number." Under similar statutes in other
states it has been held that no public right as such need be involved
to satisfy the requirement that a considerable number of persons be
affected,6 ' but no California case has so held. The rule seems to be
that the nuisance must affect a right common to the public, and the
limitation as to number of persons necessarily affected merely makes
it clear that every member of the public need not be harmed.6 2 Once
the public right is established, relatively small numbers of people
have been held sufficient.63 The number of persons who stand to be
53 CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3479.
54 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3480.
55 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3481.
56 It has been held, however, that equity will not enjoin criminal acts
unless property rights are involved. Perrin v. Mountain View Mausoleum
Ass'n, 206 Cal. 669, 275 P. 787 (1929); Hopkins v. MacCulloch, 35 Cal. App. 2d
442, 95 P.2d 950 (1939). And it has also been held that a nuisance can be
both public and private when it interferes with the use of land. Freitas v.
City of Atwater, 196 Cal. App. 2d 289, 16 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1961). This indicates
the existence of the "land" basis of private nuisance in California.
57 People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1943). See generally CAL.
CIv. CODE § 5.
58 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3480.
59 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479.
60 CAL. Civ. CODE§ 3480.
61 E.g., People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485 (1930).
62 Reinhard v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 741, 107 P.2d
501 (1940); PRossER § 89, at 607.
63 Wade v. Campbell, 200 Cal. App. 2d 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1962) (11
plaintiffs).
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affected by violation of agricultural working condition laws could
easily comprise a community in the case of a communicable disease
spread by farm workers. If the disease were carried by contaminated
crops, members of the produce market throughout the state would be
affected. This is clearly a sufficient number.
An argument might be made that the laborers themselves consti-
tute a class large enough to meet the statutory requirement. If they
were relied upon as comprising the only class affected, however, it
is unlikely that any one worker would have suffered particular dam-
age since all in the class are exposed to substantially the same actual
and potential harm. It is thus to the plaintiff's advantage to assert
that the class affected is some group other than agricultural laborers.
Secondly, in order to find that the violations discussed constitute
a public nuisance, they must fit the definition of nuisance. It is
evident that they do, since they are a hazard to public health. In
Parkhurst v. Industrial Accident Commission64 violations of the re-
quirements for covered drinking water containers and separate cups
resulted in a case of amoebic dysentery. The existence of the filthy
conditions discussed above in any food crop operation is an obvious
threat to public health. Analogously, violations of statutes impos-
ing sanitation standards in labor camps are specified as public nui-
sances.6 5 In addition, the legislature has declared that the statutes
requiring toilet and handwashing facilities were enacted in the in-
terest of public health and the dignity of the workers.6 The re-
quirement that workers use the facilities 67 could hardly have been
intended to benefit anyone but the public. Conduct which threatens
public health was a nuisance at common law,68 is declared to be
such by California statute,6 9 and has often been held a public nuisance
by California courts.
70
Having determined that the violations are a public nuisance,
there exist three possible remedies.7 1 The first is by indictment.
72
64 20 Cal. 2d 826, 129 P.2d 113 (1942).
65 CAL. LABOR CODE § 2645.
66 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 5474.20 reads as follows: "The legisla-
ture finds and declares that the people of the State of California have a pri-
mary interest in the sanitary conditions under which food crops are grown
and harvested for human consumption and in health and related sanitary
conditions under which the workers are employed in the growing and harvest-
ing of food crops. The legislature hereby finds and declares that the pro-
vision of sanitary and handwashing facilities for those employed in the grow-
ing and harvesting of food crops is necessary to the preservation of such
sanitation and health and that such facilities are necessary to maintain the
dignity of such workers."
67 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 5474.24.
68 Mills v. Hall & Richards, 9 Wend. 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Seigle
v. Bromley, 22 Colo. App. 189, 124 P. 191 (1912).
69 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3479.
70 Fisher v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 493, 61 P. 82 (1900); Cook v. Hatcher, 121
Cal. App. 398, 9 P.2d 231 (1932); City of Turlock v. Bristow, 103 Cal. App. 750,
284 P. 962 (1930); Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 259
P. 484 (1927).
71 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3491.
72 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3492; CAL. PEN. CODE § 373a.
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In California, as at common law, a public nuisance is a crime. 73 The
violations discussed, however, are crimes in their own right and it
would seem to be no more suitable a remedy to prosecute them as
a public nuisance.
The second remedy, also public, is abatement.7 4  This may be
accomplished by an action on behalf of the state brought by the dis-
trict or city attorney either in his own right,75 upon the relation of
some citizen,76 or when directed to do so by the county board of
supervisors. In the latter case, the district attorney must bring the
action.77 Certainly if such actions were brought, obviating the ne-
cessity for showing particular damage, their successful conclusion
would provide an adequate remedy. There are disadvantages, how-
ever. A certain amount of political pressure would be needed to have
such an action commenced. More important, a stricter definition of
public nuisance than that employed in private suits is used in actions
brought for abatement in the name of the public. Since this type of
action was unknown at common law, the Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia in People v. LimT 8 held that in such actions the nuisance
sought to be enjoined must either fall strictly within the definition
of section 3479 of the Civil Code or have been otherwise declared
a nuisance by the legislature. 79 The action in Lim involved a gambling
house, which the Court conceded to be a common law nuisance,80
but which it held did not fall within the statutory definition.81 The
statute was said to be a restatement of the common law definition of
nuisance insofar as its application is restricted to common law types
of action, such as indictment and private civil actions. But the stat-
ute was held to be an exclusive statement of those types of conduct
which can be enjoined as a public nuisance at the instance of a public
officer.82 Because the violations of the agricultural working condi-
tion laws discussed here consist of injury to the public health and are
within the statutory definition, an action for abatement brought by
a public official would probably be successful. However, if the
action were brought by farm workers there would be a greater
chance of success, because they need only show that the conduct is a
common law public nuisance.
8 3
The third remedy is that of a civil action brought by a person
particularly injured by a public nuisance. Such an action may re-
73 CAL. PEN. CODE § 372.
74 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3494-95.
75 People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884);
CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 731.
76 See People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374 (1897).
77 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 731.
78 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1943).
70 18 Cal. 2d at 877-78, 880-81, 118 P.2d at 475-77; accord, People v.
Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P.2d 946 (1942); People v. Seccombe, 103 Cal.
App. 306, 284 P. 725 (1930).
80 18 Cal. 2d at 876, 118 P.2d at 474.
81 18 Cal. 2d at 878-81, 118 P.2d at 475-77.
82 18 Cal. 2d at 878-81, 118 P.2d at 476-77.
83 It should be noted in connection with abatement that the type of
nuisance discussed, requiring affirmative corrective action, does not lend it-
self to nonjudicial abatement as provided for by CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3494-95.
This type of abatement may be public or private.
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sult in an injunction8 4 (either mandatory 5 or prohibitory s6) and/or
damages.8 7 The key to the plaintiff's standing in a public nuisance
action is particular damage. 88 The plaintiff's injury must be differ-
ent than that suffered by the public,89 or by himself as a member of
the public; and it has been held that the difference must be in kind
rather than in degree.8 0 This latter test has not been applied
consistently. For example, if the plaintiff were required to walk
past a chemical plant twice a day on his way to and from work, and
if the plant, because of noxious smoke and its location, were held to
be a public nuisance, it is unlikely that a court would hold that the
plaintiff had suffered particular damage, although he would be ex-
posed to the harmful effect of the nuisance considerably more often
than other members of the public."' On the other hand, homeown-
ers in the vicinity of the plant might well be said to have suffered
particular damage not only because of their property rights but be-
cause they were more seriously damaged, though in the same manner,
as more distant homeowners.92 The limited applicability of the kind-
degree distinction has led one author to conclude that anyone who
suffers substantial damage may qualify as a plaintiff. 3 Given the
rule, however, it seems clear that agricultural laborers working under
the unlawful conditions described suffer both to a greater degree, in
that their health is more seriously endangered, and in a different
manner, in that the conditions under which they work are "inde-
cent" and "offensive to the senses."
9 4
Other considerations of the public nuisance action are best cate-
gorized under the heading of defenses. First, no argument that the
84 Johnson v. V.D. Reduction Co., 175 Cal. 63, 164 P. 1119 (1917); Lind
v. City of San Luis Obispo, 109 Cal. 340, 42 P. 437 (1895); Hopkins v. Mac-
Culloch, 35 Cal. App. 2d 442, 95 P.2d 950 (1939); McLean v. Llewellyn Iron
Works, 2 Cal. App. 346, 83 P. 265 (1905).
85 Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 6 Cal. 2d 765, 59 P.2d 473 (1936);
Nicholson v. Getchell, 96 Cal. 394, 31 P. 265 (1892).
36 Brown v. Arbuckle, 88 Cal. App. 2d 258, 198 P.2d 550 (1948); McIvor
v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946).
87 Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 6 Cal. 2d 765, 59 P.2d 473 (1936);
County of Yolo v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193 (1868); McIvor v. Mercer-
Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946); Donahue v. Stockton
Gas & Elec. Co., 6 Cal. App. 276, 92 P. 196 (1907).
88 CAL. Cmv. CODE § 3493 reads as follows: "A private person may maintain
an action for a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself, but not
otherwise."
89 See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
90 Donahue v. Stockton Gas & Elec. Co., 6 Cal. App. 276, 92 P. 196 (1907);
Prosser, Private Action 1008-11.
91 See Jarvis v. Santa Clara V.R., 52 Cal. 438 (1877); PROSSER § 89, at
608-09.
92 Fisher v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 493, 61 P. 82 (1900); Wade v. Campbell,
200 Cal. App. 2d 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1962); Smith v. Collison, 119 Cal. App.
180, 6 P.2d 277 (1931).
93 PROSSER § 89, at 609.
94 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479. For cases holding a nuisance to be "offensive
to the senses," see Johnson v. V.D. Reduction Co., 174 Cal. 63, 164 P. 1119
(1917) (hogpens); Wade v. Campbell, 200 Cal. App. 2d 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173
(1962) (dairy cattle and hogpens).
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workers have acquiesced in the conditions is tenable.9 5 No lapse of
time can legalize a public nuisance.9 6  The rule that the right to
maintain a nuisance may be acquired by prescription applies to pri-
vate and not public nuisances, 97 even so far as the rights of a private
plaintiff are concerned.98  Second, an argument that the laborers are
accustomed to such conditions is of no avail to the defendant since
the standard by which nuisances are judged is their effect on per-
sons of ordinary, and not highly sensitive or hardened, sensibilities. 9
Third, an allegation that no injuries to public health have occurred
as a result of the defendant's failure to comply with sanitation laws
is of no merit, since anticipated future nuisances may be enjoined o
as long as the harm which might result from their continued ex-
istence is not merely speculative. 1 1 Finally, it is no defense to an
action for nuisance that others besides the defendant are engaged
in the same type of conduct.
102
It is thus clear that agricultural employers who fail to comply
with the provisions governing working conditions are maintaining a
health hazard which constitutes a public nuisance under California
statutory and judicial law and which may be enjoined in an action
by farm workers, whose injuries from the nuisance would meet the
requirement of particular damage.
Unfair Competition
The second proposed basis for civil actions to restrain violations
of working condition laws is that of unfair competition. Section
3369 of the Civil Code, as originally enacted, excluded only nuisance
from its rule that equity will not enjoin a crime. 0 3  The new excep-
tion of "unfair competition" was added to the original statute when it
was first amended in 1933.104 The amendment also defined unfair
competition as used therein. It included any "unfair, untrue or mis-
leading advertising and any act denounced by" certain sections of
the Penal Code. 0 5 Finally, instead of merely stating the exception
95 Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 259 P. 484 (1927).
96 CAr,. Civ. CODE § 3490; e.g., Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining
Co., 18 F. 753 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P.2d 678
(1933); Town of Cloverdale v. Smith, 128 Cal. 230, 60 P. 851 (1900).
97 Drew v. Hicks, 4 Cal. Unrep. 440, 35 P. 563 (1894) (dictum); Mills v.
Hall & Richards, 9 Wend. 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832).
98 Strong v. Sullivan, 180 Cal. 331, 181 P. 59 (1919); Bowen v. Wendt,
103 Cal. 236, 37 P. 149 (1894).
99 Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888); PROSSER § 88, at
599-600.
100 Brown v. Arbuckle, 88 Cal. App. 2d 258, 198 P.2d 550 (1948); McIvor
v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946); PROSSER § 91,
at 624.
101 People v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App. 306, 284 P. 725 (1930); PROSSER
§ 91, at 624.
102 E.g., Carter v. Chotiner, 210 Cal. 288, 291 P. 577 (1930); Nicholson v.
Getchell, 93 Cal. 394, 31 P. 265 (1892).
103 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369 (1872).
104 Cal. Stats. 1933, ch. 953, § 1, at 2482.
105 Id. The Penal Code sections were 645a-c. Their substance is now
included in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500-02, 17530-31.
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as in the case of nuisance, the amendment provided that persons en-
gaged in unfair competition could be enjoined and that the action
could be brought by certain public officials in the name of the people
or by "any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or
the general public."'1 6  Whereas no remedy for public nuisance is
provided by this particular statute, an injunction against unfair com-
petition is specifically authorized. Section 3370 of the Civil Code, en-
acted in 1949,107 added to the meaning of unfair competition, as
used in section 3369 of the Civil Code, any act prohibited by the
California Unfair Practices Act. 0 8 Section 3369 of the Civil Code
was amended once more, in 1963.109 Only one significant change was
made: the single adjective "unlawful" was added to those qualifying
"business practice" in the third subdivision.1 0
It is not suggested that violations of agricultural working condi-
tion laws fall specifically within the sections of the Business and
Professions Code on unfair competition incorporated by reference in-
to Section 3369 of the Civil Code. Sections 17000-101 of the Business
and Professions Code deal with such unfair practices as locality price
discrimination and selling of merchandise below cost. Sections 17500-
35 deal with false advertising and other misleading statements in
connection with the sale of goods and services. By far the largest
number of cases involving unfair competition under section 3369 have
been those seeking to enjoin use of a trademark or trade name
similar to that used by the plaintiff."' Actions have also been
brought to enjoin sales below cost."
2
If an action to enjoin violations of the working condition laws as
unfair competition is to succeed it must be based on the 1963 addition
of the word "unlawful" to section 3369 and on the liberality of the
courts in defining unfair business practices. Unfortunately, the
legislative history of the 1963 amendment to section 3369 is sparse.
It was passed unanimously by both houses" 3 without debate and no
committee reports dealing with the bill are available. Taking the
amendment at its word, however, it is difficult to see any other pur-
pose than to extend the meaning of unfair competition to anything
that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same
106 Cal. Stats. 1933, ch. 953, § 1, at 2482.
107 Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 652, § 1, at 1157.
108 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-101.
109 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1606, § 11 at 3184.
110 The 1963 amendment changed the reference to the repealed sections
of the Penal Code to include their counterparts in the Business and Profes-
sions Code. The amendment, however, incorporated the entire two articles
of the Business and Professions Code (§§ 17500-35) rather than only those
sections whose substance had been contained in the Penal Code. For the
complete current text of CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369, see note 34 supra.
Ill E.g., Schwartz v. Slenderella Systems, Inc., 43 Cal. 2d 107, 271 P.2d
857 (1954); Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d
685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940); Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 172 Cal. App.
2d 235, 342 P.2d 10 (1959).
112 E.g., Mering v. Yolo Grocery & Meat Market, 127 P.2d 985 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1942).
113 1963 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 4441, Reg. Sess.; 1963 JouRNAL OF THE
ASSEMBLY 4999, Reg. Sess.
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time is forbidden by law.1 4 The only statutory indication of legis-
lative purpose in the field of unfair competition is that enactments
be construed liberally. 1 5 Such a declaration, of course, is restricted
in application to the chapter it precedes and can be applied else-
where only by analogy.
The first question to be considered is whether maintenance of
unlawful working conditions by agricultural employers is a business
practice. The growing for sale of food crops is clearly a business.
The word has been defined by California courts as embracing "every-
thing about which one can be employed," 1 6 often being synony-
mous with "calling, occupation or trade, engaged in for the purpose
of making a livelihood or gain""u 7 and as "a pursuit or occupation
that employs or requires energy, time and thought; trade; profes-
sion; calling."118  It has been held elsewhere that profits, or the
expectancy thereof, are not necessary. 19 "Practice," as used in a
statute which, like section 3369 of the Civil Code, does not itself
define the word, has been held to consist of "the habitual doing of
certain things; the doing of an act more than once"' 20 and "repeated
or customary action; habitual performance; a succession of acts of
similar kind; habit; custom . "... ,12 Recognizing the fact that the
whole of such a term may not necessarily be the sum of its parts, it
is a fair inference that violations of the statutes and regulations in
question are unlawful business practices.
The second factor which must be considered is the judicial treat-
ment given to the field of unfair competition. California courts
have been liberal in extending equitable relief from unfair competi-
tion to situations beyond pure business competition. 22  The most
recent extension of the field is People v. National Research Company
of California,23 which was an action by the State to enjoin the sale to
collection agencies of "skip tracer" forms designed to obtain current
addresses from delinquent debtors. The forms were returnable to
Sacramento, resembled Department of Motor Vehicles and Depart-
ment of Employment forms, and quoted penal provisions of the Ve-
hicle and Unemployment Insurance Codes, all of which allegedly led
persons who received them to believe that one of the departments
was demanding their addresses under threat of prosecution. The
trial court had found that these practices interfered with the opera-
tion of the respective departments by threatening to diminish the
114 See generally CAL. Civ. CODE § 4.
115 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500.
116 Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr.
609 (1962).
117 Id.
118 In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 195 P. 406 (1921).
119 Dogget v. Burnet, 62 Mun. App. D.C. 103, 65 F.2d 191 (1933).
120 Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal. App. 2d 472, 267 P.2d 59 (1954). See also
Ex parte Delaney, 43 Cal. 478 (1872) (single act sufficient).
121 Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal. App. 2d 472, 267 P.2d 59 (1954).
122 People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr.
516 (1962).
123 Id.; accord, Mohr v. FTC, 272 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 920 (1960) (same defendants); Bernstein v. FTC, 200 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1952); Silverman v. FTC, 145 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1944).
January 19681
high degree of acceptance with which the public received their mail-
ings.124 The court did not base its decision on a showing of "com-
petition" with a government agency, however. It specifically stated
the general rule to be that competition between plaintiff and de-
fendant is not necessary. 125  It was emphasized that the rules of
unfair competition are based upon the public interest,120 as well as
upon the plaintiff's rights, and that the judicial trend is opposed to
narrow construction of statutory language in such a field.127 Thus,
the definition in section 3369 of the Civil Code was held not to be
restrictive or exclusive but rather to be indicative of a large area of
business conduct which cannot be tolerated in the face of an over-
riding public right.128  The defendant's practices were enjoined not
because they threatened to drive a competitor out of business but be-
cause they deceived the public.
129
The test used in the National Research Company case to deter-
mine if the defendant's conduct constituted unfair competition was
whether or not the public was likely to be deceived. The courts have
regarded this as the essential test in many cases involving trade name
infringement. 13 0 It would be erroneous to say that public deceit is
an element in all unfair competition cases, because many of the
acts which are included in the definition of the term, such as selling
below cost,13 1 are prohibited whether or not their effect is to deceive
members of the public. In a case involving a practice which is not
specifically denounced by statute as unfair competition, however, a
finding of public deceit would probably be necessary. This would be
especially likely where the plaintiff elects to sue in the name of the
public instead of solely in his own interest. Although section 3369
permits either action, the judicial emphasis on the public interest
involved in unfair competition indicates that it would be to the
farm worker's advantage to bring his action to enjoin unlawful busi-
ness practices both on behalf of the public and on his own behalf.
The plaintiff should experience no great difficulty in establishing
the element of public deceit. Since there are statutes prescribing
the standard of sanitation under which food crops are grown and
harvested, the public may rightfully rely upon the assumption that
the grower or contractor adhered to the standards. When a consumer
buys such products without realizing that they were prepared for
market under conditions which could endanger his health, he is
misled to his detriment. It being the likelihood, and not the fact, of
124 201 Cal. App. 2d at 769, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
125 201 Cal. App. 2d at 771, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
126 Accord, Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal.
2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940); Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau, Inc. v. Na-
tional Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634; 82 P.2d 3 (1938); cf. Family
Record Plan Inc. v. Mitchell, 172 Cal. App. 2d 235, 342 P.2d 10 (1959).
127 201 Cal. App. 2d at 771, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21.
128 Id.
129 201 Cal. App. 2d at 772, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
130 Schwartz v. Slenderella Systems, Inc., 43 Cal. 2d 107, 271 P.2d 857
(1954); Jackman v. Mau, 78 Cal. App. 2d 234, 177 P.2d 599 (1947); Grant v.
California Bench Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 706, 173 P.2d 817 (1946); Winfield v.
Charles, 77 Cal. App. 2d 64, 175 P.2d 69 (1946).
131 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODS § 17043.
TIM HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 19
public deception which is the essential finding, no proof that any
person was actually deceived need be offered.
132
The fact that the public is deceived by employers who are in-
strumental in placing products intended for public consumption on
the market and who fail in so doing to comply with the law regulating
their preparation is not the only basis for the contention that the
unlawful practices constitute unfair competition. The employer who
violates the working condition laws competes unfairly with other
growers and contractors in the pure business sense as well. By
neglecting to provide the facilities required, the employer of farm
labor lowers his cost of production and thereby gains an advantage
over his competitor who complies with the law. In view of the will-
ingness of the courts to construe the term "unfair competition"
broadly, it seems unlikely that they would require that sales ac-
tually be made below what the cost of production would be if the
facilities were provided. It is also doubtful that any court would
consider an argument that such means of cutting cost are used by
most of the employer's competitors as constituting a valid de-
fense.133 Finally, it may not be successfully contended that the la-
borer is not a competitor and therefore is in no position to complain,
since neither the statute nor the courts impose the requirement that
the person seeking to enjoin unlawful business practices be in com-
petition with his adversary.
13 4
With a liberal judicial treatment of cases brought under the
unfair competition provisions of section 3369 already under way, it
is significant that the word "unlawful" was added to the statute
after the decision in National Research Company expanded the defi-
nition of unfair competition. Failure to provide the required facili-
ties for agricultural laborers is clearly an unlawful method of com-
petition.
Conclusion
Although the argument for unfair competition is grounded on
principles which are not as well settled as the law of nuisance, in
the present situation an action to enjoin unlawful business prac-
tices has one important advantage over a nuisance action. The
definition of nuisance, as discussed above, is more restrictive than
that of unfair competition and, as it stands, would not include certain
violations of working condition laws, such as those imposing a limit
upon the weight which a female worker can be required to lift.
Violations of this, as well as other laws not mentioned herein, such
as the minimum wage statutes and regulations, should fall within
the definition of unfair competition.
Each type of action proposed has its advantage: in the case of
132 MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc., v. Tarantino, 106 Cal. App. 2d 504, 512,
235 P.2d 266, 271 (1951).
133 Cf. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753-54 (1945).
134 Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685,
104 P.2d 650 (1940); Schwartz v. Slenderella Systems, Inc., 43 Cal. 2d 107,
271 P.2d 857 (1954); People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765,
20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962); MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 106 Cal.
App. 2d 504, 235 P.2d 266 (1951).
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public nuisance there are well established principles into which
the problem discussed easily fits, and in the case of unfair competition
a wider range of violations may be restrained. It is believed that
an action to enjoin the continuance of unlawful working conditions
could be successfully litigated in either field.
13 5
Philip L. Judson*
135 A possibility not to be overlooked is that of bringing a class action
under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 382, which provides in part that "when the
question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before
the Court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." Although
a class action is desirable in order to reduce costs and produce more wide-
spread results, it is doubtful that such an action would be permitted since
the courts have consistently held that a common fund or property must be the
subject matter of the action and that there must be a well-defined community
of interest therein, primarily because the judgment in such an action is bind-
ing on all representees. See Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n,
32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948), noted in 37 CALiF. L. REV. 525 (1949);
Noroian v. Bennett, 179 Cal. 806, 179 P. 158 (1919); Watson v. Santa Car-
melita Mut. Water Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 709, 137 P.2d 757 (1943); Fallon v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 2d 48, 90 P.2d 858 (1939); Blume, The "Common
Questions" Principle in the Code Provision For Representative Suits, 30 lMcH.
L. Rav. 878 (1932).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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